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Introduction 
The rapid increase in global economic losses from climate-related disasters has re-intensified 
a discourse among private insurers, governments and international organizations about the 
role of insurance in addressing these risks.  The discourse follows two broad strands:  Reform 
efforts for existing insurance schemes, such as systems in the United Kingdom and the 
United States; and efforts to design new schemes in less established markets in order to 
support climate-resilient development through a more anticipatory risk view. In addition, 
insurance is also considered as a mechanism for addressing loss and damage of climate 
change. This briefing note highlights a few key observations relevant for the discussion about 
the future use of insurance.    
 
 
Use of insurance is unevenly applied across the world.  
Risk management and insurance is widely used in most developed countries, albeit with 
significant local differences in uptake and utilization. Summaries of existing coverage from 
European insurance and reinsurance federation (CEA, 2009) identify a patchwork of 
schemes, with the extent and scope of risk transfer varying from country to country. 
Insurance remains far less established in low-income countries, with reliance on post-
disaster aid and informal safety nets forming the largest part of disaster funding in those 
countries (World Bank, 2013).  The penetration of insurance is to a large extent dependent 
on income levels, with rising income linked to increasing insurance penetration (Ibarra and 
Skees, 2007; see also Ranger and Surminski, 2011). This is one explanation for the low usage 
of insurance in developing countries. In addition to income, a range of other factors are at 
play in driving insurance penetration (Ranger and Surminski, 2011), such as stable and 
effective institutions, law enforcement and the availability of risk data (Hussels et al., 2005; 
Brainard, 2008). Other driving factors include education and financial literacy levels (Masci et 
al., 2007) and specific market characteristics for private sector involvement, such as 
distribution channels, a functioning financial sector, access to global markets and the 
appetite for innovation in terms of products and services (UNCTAD, 2012; see also Freeman 
and Kunreuther,1997 for an overview).  
 
 
New insurance schemes in developing countries are emerging.  
Over the past few years a range of new risk transfer schemes have been implemented, often 
in response to demand and supply challenges, testing innovative risk transfer forms such as 
regional pools, micro-insurance or index-based risk transfers. Initiatives such as the G7’s 
InsurResilience are promoting the extension of climate insurance usage in developing 
countries. A recent summary of existing and newly proposed schemes is provided in a study 
commissioned by the Climate Investment Funds (Vivid Economics, 2015). The ClimateWise 
Compendium (ClimateWise, 2011) on disaster risk transfer documents 123 existing initiatives 
in middle-income and lower-income countries that involve the transfer of financial risk 
associated with the occurrence of natural hazards such as flooding (Surminski and Oramas-
Dorta, 2011). The Compendium indicates an increasing potential for risk transfer 
instruments in developing countries. The documented insurance schemes show a wide 
diversity, with application of schemes to specific needs or communities, a range of 
stakeholders and the accommodation of differing levels of risk transfer. Provision varies 
from private insurers, government to public-private partnerships. The most common 
example across all countries is agricultural insurance, although there are specific 
geographical preferences, for example, micro-insurance for natural disasters in Asia. This 
may reflect cultural difference or local traditions and may also be linked to the availability of 
financing tools such as micro-finance (Surminski and Oramas-Dorta, 2014). 
 
Both public and private sector are involved in provision of insurance.  
Surminski (2014) shows that a range of public and private sector offerings exists, often also 
in partnership, where both sides take on different roles and responsibilities. It remains 
unclear whether private or public insurance provision is more effective. In the absence of a 
best practice template Paudel et al. (2012) propose a greater focus on public-private 
partnerships, where the government and private insurers share the provision of 
underwriting. In developed countries the role of the state as an insurer of last resort is also 
an important consideration. If the stability of financial markets is threatened then the 
government may step in to secure continuing cover (Dobes et al., 2013). At the same time 
policy makers aim for greater engagement of the private sector with a view to achieve 
higher efficiency and to support insurance sector growth through the application of a market 
based mechanism.   For low and middle income countries the ClimateWise Compendium on 
disaster risk transfer (ClimateWise, 2011) differentiates between the risk transfer role and 
other roles, such as operational support functions. The private sector is providing the actual 
risk transfer in 41% of schemes, with varying risk levels and volumes of insurance and 
reinsurance layers included in the different schemes. In the majority of cases where the 
public sector is involved in risk transfer, it does so in partnership with the private sector 
(52%). These partnerships between the public and private sectors dominate in the provision 
of risk transfer in the case of indemnity-based agricultural insurance schemes, property 
catastrophe insurance schemes and sovereign schemes. For index-based agricultural 
insurance schemes, however, the provision of risk transfer by the private sector is more 
frequent.  There is no exclusive public provision of index insurance for schemes covering 
flood. The role of the third sector in the provision of risk transfer is comparatively small 
(Surminski and Oramas-Dorta, 2011; Surminski, 2014), but could be changing in the light of 
recent momentum to develop new climate insurance schemes.  
 
 
Insurance can play a role in increasing climate resilience.  
In general terms insurance can buffer and smooth the effects of losses, thus avoiding the 
prospect of severe financial consequences (Brainard,,2008). It  offers a shift in the 
mobilization of financial resources away from an ad hoc post-event scenario, where funding 
is often unpredictable and delayed, towards a more strategic, and in many cases more 
efficient, pre-disaster set-up. While not stopping disasters, insurance is designed to address 
liquidity needs in their immediate aftermath and help fund the recovery process. Purchased 
and implemented prior to an event, risk financing can be applied to address the financial 
needs of governments (sovereign insurance, reserve funds, contingent credit lines), 
businesses (property and business insurance), farmers (agricultural insurance) and 
individuals (property and micro-insurance).  
 
 
 
Evidence from existing insurance schemes offers important lessons.  
In Europe and the US flood insurance is already under heavy pressure from rising risk levels 
due to misguided building and land use practices, as well as environmental and climatic 
changes. Recent figures emerging from the UK, highlighted by the Bank of England (PRA and 
BoE, 2015), show that climate change and socio-economic risk drivers are expected to widen 
the gap between ‘affordable’ flood insurance premiums and premiums that reflect the 
technical price of flood insurance. (Surminski, Bouwer and Linnerooth–Bayer,2016) 
Reforming existing insurance schemes appears very challenging, as the case of the UK flood 
shows. This is why the discussions about new schemes in developing countries are so 
important. Here is a chance to avoid repeating those past mistakes in established markets, 
particularly regarding the missing link between risk transfer and risk reduction. (Surminski, 
2014).  
 
Climate insurance faces barriers on supply and demand side.  
The Vivid study notes several demand-side barriers in developing countries – such as low 
income, lack of trust, lack of financial literacy and misunderstanding of risks and role of 
insurance as well as the existence of alternative measures including humanitarian assistance. 
On the supply-side the study highlights risk characteristics, lack of data, lack of technical 
capacity and unsupportive regulatory frameworks. (Vivid Economics, 2015) 
 
 
Insurance does not offer a solution to all climate risks.   
Insurance theory and recent cost-benefit assessments indicate that risk financing is only 
viable for large and residual risks that cannot be reduced or managed otherwise (Mechler, 
et.al. 2014). It is also widely accepted that insurance does not provide a solution to all 
climate risks (Warner et al., 2009). The use of insurance is common for extreme events, but 
not suitable for changes in ‘average’ conditions or slow onset events such as sea-level rise 
(Ranger et al., 2011). Overall the extent to which insurance can feature is risk and country-
specific and dependent on local risk appetite, as well as societal values. 
   
 
Insurance can foster better understanding of climate risk. 
Data collected for insurance purposes can support the general understanding of risks and 
provide information for the design of climate adaptation measures. This can go as far as 
signaling the un-insurability of a certain risk. For example  in areas where floods occur very 
frequently, which may in turn lead to the employment of other disaster risk management 
(DRM) and adaptation measures. However, this risk signaling function of insurance is often 
obscured, mainly because concerns about affordability lead to subsidization approaches or 
because of a lack of data and technical know-how (Surminski, 2014).  
 
Insurance has several limitations in the context of climate risk. 
The Vivid Economics study for CIF  (Vivid Economics,  2015) suggests that climate insurance 
can play an important role in climate adaptation. But it also warns that inappropriately set-
up insurance schemes can have unwanted consequences and may not benefit the poor nor 
foster climate resilience. Insurance can increase the potential for moral hazard and 
reduction of incentives for risk reduction, particularly if poorly designed and implemented 
(Surminski, 2014). It can also lead to a ‘business as usual’ approach, providing disincentives 
for governments, businesses or individuals to act, which could jeopardize efforts of climate-
resilient development. This highlights the risk of using insurance to support climate-resilient 
development, whereby insurance can create a false sense of security or encourage 
development in high-risk areas.  Such moral hazard can affect individuals, businesses and 
even governments. Fankhauser and McDermott (2014) find a negative relationship between 
the extent of insurance cover and the demand for adaptation, with ‘insurance acting as a 
substitute for adaptation’.  
 
 
Insurance is usually not designed with risk reduction and adaptation in 
mind.  
There is very little consideration if and how insurance can influence the underlying risk-
decision when designing or reforming insurance schemes, as evidence from both established 
and newly emerging insurance schemes shows. (Surminski, 2014; Surminski and Oramas-
Dorta 2014). Vivid Economics (2015) suggests that three key questions should be considered 
before any plans are made to invest in or design climate insurance schemes:  
 How does the insurance proposal fit within a broader integrated risk management 
package? 
 How has climate change been included in the underlying risk assessment and 
analysis? 
 How will the scheme incentivise risk reduction and stronger adaptive behaviour? 
 
Climate change poses opportunities and threats for insurance.   
In the context of climate change it is important to reflect how future climatic impacts may 
change the suitability of insurance. Theory and evidence from existing insurance markets 
suggests that a ‘riskier and more uncertain world would be associated with an increase in 
insurance demand, at least until some local threshold were reached where the affordability 
of insurance or the insurability of risk were threatened’ (Ranger and Surminski, 2013). While 
the complex interactions and uncertainties mean that it is impossible to forecast 
quantitatively the future impacts of climate change on insurance demand, Ranger and 
Surminski (2013) conduct a preliminary evaluation of the relative scale and directions. 
Mapping the influence and trends through the use of scenarios, the study shows that the 
influence of climate change on insurance demand to 2030 is likely to be small but not 
insignificant when compared with the expected growth due to rising incomes. This effect 
could intensify, however, if policy makers introduce regulatory mechanisms to counter 
climate change, such as obligatory insurance and state-subsidized insurance products. The 
same also applies if new business opportunities arise following measures designed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to climate change.  
 
 
Insurance can support but not replace efforts of addressing loss and 
damage from climate change.  
While some climate risks can be reduced through better preparedness and adaptation, there 
will always be residual risks that leave those exposed with significant financial gaps and an 
increased risk of poverty. What can insurance offer for those risks ‘beyond risk reduction and 
adaptation’? This is starting to be addressed as part of the Loss and Damage (L&D) discourse 
within the international climate change negotiations. The discourse has evolved around 
different perspectives (see the discussion about insurance in Brown and Seck, 2013), with 
Surminski and Lopez (2014) proposing three categories of decision making goals for the 
UNFCCC’s L&D discourse:  
 
 To create awareness about the sensitivity of human and natural systems to climate 
and the need to respond with appropriate mitigation, adaptation and DRR policies;  
 To develop risk reduction and risk management responses, with the goal to enhance 
adaptation to reduce vulnerability and build resilience; in this case the evaluation of 
climate risk is a necessary component of any adaptation options appraisal.  
 To inform compensation arrangements for L&D. 
 
The first and second category show many analogies with climate change adaptation and 
disaster risk reduction, asking how to assess and how to respond to risks as well as 
acknowledging the scale of the potential impacts. Clearly insurance can play a supporting 
role for the first and second category if embedded in a broad set of instruments and 
approaches. However, this applies only to extreme events, rather than to impacts from slow-
onset changes.   
The compensation component of L&D, however, offers a different dimension to the climate 
change discussion. While not explicitly outlined in the official UNFCCC language, this is an 
underlying aim that has been driving the L&D debate since its beginnings. The focus on 
compensation for those climate impacts that are beyond mitigation and adaptation’s reach 
poses some additional challenges for decision makers – particularly in the context of the 
underlying science, where approaches used to estimate the attributable part of the risk of 
L&D to human induced climate change are highly debated within the science community. 
(Surminski and Lopez, 2014) If and how insurance can be used in the context of 
compensation for  L&D other than extreme events is far from clear.   
 
One aspect often overlooked is the equity of any proposed insurance solutions: ‘As the 
intensity and frequency of climate extremes increase, is it fair to shift responsibility onto 
those least responsible, least able to shoulder the premium, and in many cases least able to 
reduce the losses?’  (Surminski, Bouwer and Linnerooth-Bayer, 2016) Subsidies can help to 
avoid shifting the burden to those most vulnerable, however this also means that insurance 
may not offer value for money compared to other mechanisms due to high transaction and 
capital costs. This suggests that adaptation funds might be better spent on other types of 
safety nets rather than buying insurance cover from international insurance markets (Suarez 
and Linnerooth-Bayer, 2011).  A further point to consider is the appetite from policy makers 
to use adaptation financing as a way to financially support private insurance companies. A 
study of L&D stakeholder perspectives (Surminski and Eldridge, 2015) show different 
degrees of ‘enthusiasm’ for private market solutions from policy makers, and indicate some 
cautious support from the few private sector representatives that have been engaged in the 
debate so far. 
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